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1.  Introduction 
As economic conditions deteriorate during recessions, it is well recognized that 
existing consumer credits will display higher delinquency and default rates.  For example, 
empirical investigations of mortgage default (Deng et al, 2000) show that as 
unemployment rates rise, mortgage defaults increase. It is less clear what the effect of 
rising expectations of worsening economic conditions should be on the pool of borrowers 
applying for credit or drawing on credit lines. 
    Neoclassical consumption theories suggest that as consumer expectations of 
future unemployment rises, expected lifetime wealth will decline, and consumption 
should fall.  This should cause those consumers most likely to experience unemployment 
to reduce their current expenditures, so that the pool of borrowers should improve in the 
sense of a shift in composition of the pool toward the higher credit quality range.  If this 
occurs simultaneously with tightening credit standards on the part of lenders, the 
proportion of higher credit quality borrowers will rise due to constraints on both the 
demand and supply side. 
    However, recent empirical research has suggested that households have strong 
precautionary motives and typically desire to preserve purchasing power. Gross and 
Souleles (2002a) show that when consumer credit card lines increase exogenously,  
consumers display a relatively large marginal propensity to consume even if they have 
substantial credit available on their existing lines.  If households worry about their ability 
to borrow in the future or have concerns about their future liquidity, then it is possible 
that households whose subjective probability of unemployment has risen may increase 
their current borrowing.  In contrast to the classical view, such households will borrow 
preemptively when their confidence is low—not to increase their current consumption, 
but to ensure their access to liquidity in the future.  As a consequence, the pool of 
borrowers may worsen observably, even if credit standards are tightened.
1  Alternatively, 
                                                 
1 Dick and Lehnert (2010) argue that heightened competition among banks leads to easing of credit 
standards.  Their paper focuses on the historical effects of the lifting of geographic barriers to entry in 
banking.  To the extent that banks have to compete more aggressively for borrowers when credit demand 4 
 
or in addition, the credit quality of the pool may decline along unobservable dimensions, 
exacerbating the kind of adverse selection problem highlighted in Brueckner (2000).  In 
this case, as lenders update their estimates of the underlying riskiness of the borrower 
pool, the analysis in Brueckner (2000) suggests that credit markets will respond 
procyclically, charging higher risk premiums for larger credit lines or those with higher 
loan-to-value ratios, and reducing the availability of lower cost credit.
2   
    Anecdotal evidence on preemptive borrowing is offered in a recent article in the 
New York Times.
3  The article notes that consumers with home equity lines of credit are 
finding their lines cut as home prices have fallen, and that one way they can preserve 
borrowing power is to borrow preemptively.  A mortgage loan officer interviewed 
encourages consumers to preemptively borrow $100 thousand on their home equity line 
of credit and invest the proceeds in a bank term CD (doing so with a 4 percent interest 
rate on the home equity line and a 3 percent rate on the CD has a cost of $1000).   This 
cost may be small compared to the transactions cost of selling one’s home or other costs 
due to a period of unemployment.   
    In this study, we investigate how the credit risk profile of households with newly 
originated home equity line of credit (HELOC) accounts varies in relation to regional 
economic conditions during 2002 through 2007, using data provided by the data and 
analytics firm CoreLogic.
4  This unique database tracking monthly utilization and 
payment performance of the HELOC accounts of several of the largest U.S. home equity 
lenders has not previously been available for academic research.  We find evidence of 
both “credit cycle” effects of macroeconomic variables on observable indicators of 
borrower credit risk, as well as evidence of cyclical adverse selection.  On the one hand, 
                                                                                                                                                 
weakens, such effects could reinforce the effect of precautionary borrowing motives on the quality of the 
borrower pool.   
2 To the extent that HELOC markets rely on collateral, improved technology for monitoring collateral 
would work in the direction of allowing more risk to be accepted.  On the other hand, when housing 
markets become thinner, information about collateral is likely to become less precise, and risks are greater, 
exacerbating the tightening of credit standards.  
3 See Tedeschi (2008).   
4 CoreLogic is a leading provider of consumer, financial and property information, analytics and services to 
business and government. The company has developed U.S. real estate, mortgage application, fraud, and 
loan performance databases combining public, contributory, and proprietary data and is a provider of 
mortgage and automotive credit reporting, property tax, valuation, flood determination, and geospatial 





consistent with the classical view, we observe that lenders and borrowers respond to 
appreciating home values and other favorable economic conditions by obtaining or 
expanding home equity credit lines and increasing debt payment-to-income ratios.  On 
the other hand, consistent with adverse selection, we find that all else equal, households 
drawing on new credit lines when consumer confidence has declined are more likely to 
fall behind in their payments. 
    We conduct a comprehensive analysis, employing both panel data and competing 
risk hazard rate modeling.  Panel models estimated with monthly data aggregated to the 
county level are used to analyze the relationship between average measures of borrower 
credit risk and economic variables.  A competing risk survival analysis of delinquency 
and prepayment (defined as paying the HELOC balance down to zero) is used to test for 
adverse selection effects related to the regional index of consumer confidence and local 
unemployment rate conditions.   
    In particular, a key contribution of the study is the examination of adverse 
selection effects tied to changing macroeconomic conditions in the context of consumer 
credit.  Prior studies that have looked at adverse selection in consumer credit markets 
typically have focused on specific cases where adverse selection effects appear to explain 
observed patterns of delinquency.  For instance, Gross and Souleles (2002b) document an 
increase in the riskiness of borrowers who were issued new credit cards during the period 
1995 through 1997 that was reflected in deteriorating performance but was not detectable 
using standard credit quality indicators at the time of issuance.  Another prominent 
example is adverse selection tied to the broker origination channel in the subprime 
mortgage market, which has been cited as a contributing factor in the subprime crisis 
(Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil 2009, Keys et al. 2009). 
A secondary contribution of this study is methodological, demonstrating the 
importance of isolating the effect of exit of lower risk borrowers resulting from 
prepayments for identifying adverse selection tied to cyclical economic factors.  
Moreover, we develop new ways of modeling the competing risk of delinquency and 
prepayment for HELOC accounts, which, compared to closed-end first mortgages, have 
received relatively little attention in the literature. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews 
previous studies focusing on the utilization and credit performance of HELOCs.  Section 6 
 
3 discusses the data used in the study.  Section 4 develops the panel data models and 
presents the estimation results for these models.  Section 5 presents the competing risk 
hazard analysis and discusses the evidence of cycle-driven adverse selection effects.  
Section 6 provides concluding comments. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
We are aware of only a few previous studies that have examined the utilization 
behavior or credit risk of home equity lines of credit specifically or home equity loans 
together with lines: Agarwal, Ambrose, and Liu (2006); Agarwal, Ambrose, 
Chomsisengphet, and Liu (2006); and Yamashita (2007).   Our study is readily 
distinguished from these earlier studies by period examined and data source.  The first 
study relies on a sample from a single large financial institution, containing roughly 
79,000 HELOCs and 56,000 closed-end home equity loans originated between January 
1994 and May 2001 to borrowers located almost entirely in New York, New Jersey, and 
the New England states.  Performance of the loans is tracked through May 2002.  The 
second study relies on a subset of the same sample, consisting of roughly 35,000 
HELOCS originated between January 1998 and May 2001.  The third study relies on the 
1982 through 1993 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which is a 
longitudinal survey of a representative sample of U.S. families begun in 1968. 
The study by Agarwal, Ambrose, and Liu (2006) has some similarity to our study 
in that it offers evidence suggestive of precautionary motives affecting HELOC 
utilization.  The study tests two hypotheses about line utilization.  The first is that 
borrowers with lower FICO scores, who represent those at greater risk of financial 
shocks, have lower initial utilization.  An estimated regression equation for initial 
utilization supports this hypothesis, even after applying a correction for selection bias (in 
the accept-reject decision).  The second hypothesis is that borrowers who experience 
credit shocks, represented by those exhibiting a decline in their FICO score, use their 
lines more.  A multinomial logit model representing the competing risks of full 
prepayment, partial prepayment, and increased utilization indicates that a decline in FICO 
(lagged four months) results in increased utilization, consistent with the hypothesis.   
Agarwal, Ambrose, Chomsingsengphet, and Liu (2006) estimate and compare the 
responsiveness of prepayment and default of home equity loans, home equity lines, and 7 
 
first mortgages to economic factors.  The findings suggest that both equity loans and lines 
prepay to take advantage of declining interest rates (interest rate refinance) and increasing 
property values (cash out refinance.)   Home equity loans appear almost twice as 
sensitive as home equity lines to interest rate changes.  Prepayment and default are more 
sensitive to credit shocks for first mortgages and home equity loans than for home equity 
lines.  The latter finding is viewed as consistent with the finding in Agarwal, Ambrose, 
and Liu (2006) that individuals who face credit shocks are comparatively likely to 
increase use of a home equity line. 
Yamashita (2007) examines how households use second mortgages (both loans 
and lines) in response to shocks to housing wealth. The empirical results indicate that, on 
average, house price appreciation is associated with increased second mortgage 
borrowing, consistent with results from our study.  In addition, Yamashita (2007) finds 
that responsiveness differs across households in relation to age and the ratio of liquid 
wealth to income.  Younger households and those with lower wealth-to-income exhibit a 
strong reaction to house price appreciation, whereas high wealth-to-income ones do not. 
These results are interpreted as evidence of the importance of liquidity constraints among 
homeowners.   
 
3.  Data 
Our study relies on historical, account-level data on the monthly payment and 
utilization performance of the HELOC accounts of three of the largest HELOC lenders in 
the U.S.  These data are drawn from CoreLogic’s HomeEquity database, a data product 
covering all HELOC and closed-end junior lien mortgages serviced by the top four U.S. 
originators and servicers of these mortgage products as well as several smaller banks. 
5  
Only HELOCs are used in this analysis, since our focus is on utilization of credit lines.   
The three lenders included in our study were selected based on extent of coverage 
of historical performance and account-level characteristics in the database; their identities 
were kept anonymous in the research data set provided to us.  Loan characteristic and 
dynamic loan performance information are available for these three lenders from January 
                                                 
5 As of 2010 Q1, the database included 5.4 million active HELOCs. 8 
 
2002 onward.
6  The data made available to us for this study track account performance 
through August 2007, which is about when the recent “crisis” period commenced in the 
mortgage market.  Thus, the period of analysis for this study is January 2002 through 
August 2007; for the hazard models, attention is restricted to loans originated through 
May 2007. 
Account-level characteristics provided in the database include the origination 
date; maturity date; origination channel (retail, broker, wholesale/correspondent); lien 
position (first or junior); original credit limit, and combined loan-to-value ratio (of all 
liens).  The data also include the borrower’s original FICO score and ratio of (total 
mortgage and consumer) debt payment to income.  In addition, the data provide the index 
interest rate (generally the prime rate) and margin that together determine the contractual 
interest rate.  (Often, HELOCs are priced using a tiered structure for the margin, such that 
the margin declines as the balance increases above a specified threshold.  Presumably, the 
reported margin is that associated with the original drawn amount.)  The geographic 
location and type of property (single-family home, condominium, etc.) are also  provided. 
The database provides monthly performance updates for each HELOC account, 
including outstanding principal balance, draw amount, and payment status (number of 
days delinquent).  Updated credit limits and refreshed FICO scores are also reported, 
when they occur.
7  Monthly utilization rates are obtained by dividing the outstanding 
principal balance by the credit limit.  
The database incorporates a substantial number of accounts originated prior to 
2002.  These lack full performance histories, and their inclusion in our study could 
introduce survivor bias, since accounts opened and then closed prior to January 2002 are 
not in the sample.  Therefore, we exclude all accounts originated prior to December 2001.   
About one-fifth of the remaining accounts were not utilized when they were first 
opened.  Including these accounts in the sample would cloud interpretation of the results, 
for two reasons.  First,  this cohort contains substantial unobserved heterogeneity, 
because it is impossible to distinguish among customers with specific plans to draw on 
                                                 
6 The database includes loans originated prior to 2002 and their characteristics; however, dynamic 
performance information is available beginning only in 2002.  
7 When available, a FICO score dated one or two months after origination is utilized as a proxy for the 
origination FICO score if the origination FICO score is missing. About 98 percent of accounts in the 
sample had origination FICO reported and another 1 percent had a FICO score dated one or two months 
after origination. 9 
 
their credit lines in the future, those with cautionary motives, and those obtaining credit 
lines primarily for convenience or in response to marketing appeals.  Second, there is a 
lack of comparability between this cohort and customers who utilize their HELOC 
accounts from the start.  For the latter, the date of origination is the same as the date of 
the first draw on the credit line.  For customers whose draws occur later, individual 
circumstances or broader economic conditions at the draw date may be more relevant to 
the borrowers’ motives and credit quality than circumstances at origination.  Moreover, 
the database contains more information associated with the date of origination.  For these 
reasons, we restrict attention to accounts having a utilization rate of 10 percent or greater 
and a balance no less than $10,000 within three months of origination.
8 
Standard data quality and consistency checks and edits were applied to the data 
prior to conducting statistical analysis.
9  No systematic data problems were detected.  As 
is typically the case with industry-supplied data, there is a moderate frequency of missing 
information on borrower characteristics, particularly origination FICO scores, combined 
loan-to-value ratios, and debt payment-to-income ratios.  The occurrence of missing 
information for these variables is not correlated with other indicators of credit quality or 
payment performance such as initial utilization rates, size of the credit line, or subsequent 
payment delinquency.     
Figure 1 plots the number of originations by month in the HELOC sample, from 
December 2001 through June 2007.  The pace of HELOC origination activity increased 
during the first half of this period, peaked in the second quarter of 2004, and then 
declined.  There appears to be a seasonal component, with origination activity relatively 
high in the second quarter.  Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of the sample by 
census division.  The Pacific division contains the single largest share, at 40 percent, with 
another 40 percent distributed roughly evenly across the South Atlantic, Mountain, and 
East North Central divisions.   
Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistics for account-level variables employed 
in the study, distinguishing among three origination channel categories: retail; wholesale 
                                                 
8 About 22 percent of accounts in the sample were excluded by these restrictions.   
9 For instance, accounts with initial utilization exceeding 125 percent were excluded.  Combined loan-to-
value ratios greater than 125 percent and debt payment-to-income ratios greater than 70 percent were set 
equal to missing.  Such cases were rare.  We also checked for inconsistencies among reported lien status, 
credit limit, appraised value, and combined LTV; these were also rare. 10 
 
or broker; and other.
10  Table 1 focuses on lien status and property type and indicates that 
the sample is relatively homogeneous along these dimensions.  Notably, HELOCs 
secured by condo or co-op properties, which constitute 12 percent of the sample, were 
disproportionately originated through the wholesale and broker channels.  Table 2 reports 
means, quartiles, and missing data frequencies for continuous variables.   Borrowers can 
be generally characterized as prime, as indicated by FICO scores at origination well 
above the 620 threshold typically used to define subprime credits.  The average combined 
loan-to-value ratio for the full sample is 83 percent, exceeding the minimum 80 percent 
loan-to-value that generally is required to waive private mortgage insurance on a first-
lien, prime mortgage.  Combined LTVs, utilization rates, payment-to-income ratios, and 
interest rate margins are higher for wholesale compared to retail, suggesting higher credit 
risk of loans originated through the wholesale channel.  Broker-originated accounts 
exhibit even higher values for these variables. 
Economic data.  Our study also employs a variety of economic time series and 
panel data.  These include monthly interest rate data from the Federal Reserve (the bank 
prime interest rate, federal funds rate, and 10-year Treasury bill rate) and monthly 
refinance share of first-lien, prime, conventional conforming home mortgage applications 
from Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market Survey.
11  In addition, we use the 
Conference Board’s monthly regional Consumer Confidence Index for the nine U.S. 
census regions; quarterly state and metropolitan area (CBSA) house price indexes from 
the Federal Housing Finance Agency; and monthly state and county unemployment rates 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  State-level house price and unemployment data are 
used for counties lacking this information at the more local level.  We convert the 
quarterly house price data to monthly data using a rolling weighted average.  The 
difference between the 10-year Treasury bill interest rate and the federal funds rate is 
employed as a measure of the “yield curve.”    
                                                 
10 Accounts with loan source identified as “Mortgage Broker” were slotted to the broker category; those 
with source identified as “Wholesale,” “Other,” or “Unknown” were slotted to the wholesale channel, and 
those with source identified as “Retail,” “Internet,” or “Correspondence” were slotted to retail.  We 
combined the more granular loan source classification found in the data on the basis of similar distributions 
of account characteristics such as combined loan-to-value ratio and credit limit amount, because some of 
the individual classifications contained too few accounts to model separately. 




The January 2002 through August 2007 period of analysis encompasses a fair 
amount of variation and cyclicality in these economic variables.  Figure 3 displays the 
time series of the 10-year Treasury bill interest rate, the federal funds rate and the Freddie 
Mac refinance share measure for this period.  During this period, the prime rate (not 
shown in the figure) maintained a fairly constant, 3-percentage-point spread above the 
federal funds rate. Figure 4 shows the median and first and third quartiles of local area 
unemployment rates where the rankings are point-in-time across all counties represented 
in the sample, weighting by number of accounts.  Figure 5 shows the median and first and 
third quartiles of local area (CBSA) house price appreciation rates calculated over the 
prior 12-month period, where again the rankings are point-in-time across localities, 
weighting by number of accounts.  Table 3 provides means, medians and maximum and 
minimum values of the Consumer Confidence Index for each of the nine census regions.  
The Mountain, South Atlantic, and West Central are characterized by relatively high 
mean and median values of the index, while East North Central, Middle Atlantic, and 
New England census divisions exhibit relatively low mean and median values.
12  Within 
each range, there is substantial temporal variation in the level of consumer confidence, as 
reflected in the maximum and minimum values of the index in each region. 
 
4. Panel Models 
  We begin by investigating the consistency of borrower and lender behavior with 
neoclassical consumption theory and/or adverse selection effects using panel models.  
The panel model estimations aggregate home equity lines of credit originations by 
county-month.  Each observation is the average for a given county and month.
13  
Observations from Louisiana and Mississippi, where most delinquencies were a 
consequence of Hurricane Katrina, and observations with fewer than 10 originated 
HELOCs are excluded.  We weight each observation by the number of home equity lines 
of credit originated in the county and month. 
The underlying data aggregate over 3 million home equity lines into some 90 
thousand county-month observations, but after eliminating county-months with less than 
10 originations and with the exclusion of Louisiana and Mississippi, the data reduce to 
                                                 
12 Excluding June, July, and August 2007 for consistency with the range of origination dates in the sample 
used for the hazard analysis does not materially alter the values in Table 3. 
13 Essentially the same results are obtained using median in place of average. 12 
 
2.8 million accounts aggregating to 29,884 observations.
14  The resulting panel consists 
of 841 counties over the period from January 2002 to August 2007.   
The panel model regression equations relate characteristics of the HELOCs – the 
quality of the borrower, size of the credit line, pricing, and pace of originations –  to 
economic conditions, including recent county house price appreciation, the yield curve 
and change in the prime rate, regional consumer confidence, and the forward and 
backward county unemployment rate change.  We include county fixed effects, as well as 
lagged dependent variables to address autocorrelation.  In addition, in alternative 
specifications we incorporate either a (quadratic) time trend relationship or a set of 
monthly dummy variables (in the latter case dropping the yield curve and prime rate 
change). 
The relations among the economic factors and borrower and account 
characteristics observed in the county-level panel data set reflect the net effect of the 
demand for and supply of credit.  Aggregate credit demand can be impacted by cyclical 
changes in borrower behavior consistent with neoclassical consumption theory as well as 
behavior reflecting adverse selection.  On the supply side, lenders’ risk aversion, as 
reflected by credit policy, will also change over the course of the credit cycle.  Given 
different levels of information, borrowers and lenders may not respond with the same 
speed to changing economic conditions in altering the demand for and supply of credit.  
  The time period used in the regression analysis generally corresponds to rising 
house prices and a lowering of credit standards but also includes the beginning of the 
decline of house prices and uptick in delinquencies.  Evidence of improved borrower 
credit quality as economic conditions deteriorate is consistent with neoclassical “credit 
cycle” effects as consumers restrict borrowing and lenders tighten credit standards in 
response to a decrease in expected future wealth.   Similarly, credit cycle effects are 
consistent with decreased borrower credit quality and relaxed lending standards during 
periods of robust economic growth.  Evidence of deterioration in borrower credit quality 
as economic conditions deteriorate, however, is consistent with adverse selection and 
precautionary borrowing motives.  
  Explanatory variables.  The regional consumer confidence index and the county 
12-month forward unemployment rate change capture the effects of precautionary 
                                                 
14 Prior to eliminating Louisiana and Mississippi, the number of county-month observations is 30,369. 13 
 
motives and adverse selection.  Our hypothesis is that precautionary motives and adverse 
selection are associated with deterioration in the quality of the borrower pool as regional 
consumer confidence falls or the forward unemployment rate rises.
15 The Conference 
Board’s regional consumer confidence index is a measure of local consumer expectations 
about labor market conditions.  Bram and Ludvigson (1998) argue that the Conference 
Board’s confidence measure is more predictive of consumption behavior than the 
Michigan survey because it emphasizes labor market conditions and prospects. Garrett et 
al. (2005) argue that there is some information about regional consumption in the 
Conference Board’s regional consumer confidence indexes.  The forward unemployment 
rate change may be a useful measure of private information on the part of households on 
the assumption that residents are better forecasters of local employment conditions than 
lenders.  In particular, workers at an establishment that may shut down have a strong 
incentive to acquire additional information about that likelihood. 
  The county house price appreciation rate is calculated as the change in the log 
price over the prior 12 months and thus captures recent increases in the value of the 
collateral available to be borrowed against.  We interpret the yield curve, as in Bernanke 
and Blinder (1992), as a forward-looking measure of monetary policy.  The yield curve is 
positive when the Federal Open Market Committee has lowered rates and is negative 
when monetary policy is being aggressively tightened.  The prime rate has a direct 
influence on the cost of credit, since the floating interest rate on the HELOC is typically 
tied to the prime rate. The variable prime rate plus a fixed margin specified in the 
HELOC contract determines the interest paid on the HELOC.  
Empirical model specifications.  Our first set of panel regression equations 
employs a quadratic specification for time to control for general market trends in addition 
to the explanatory variables introduced above.  A second set appends the (endogenous) 
dependent variables from the other equations as covariates.  A third and fourth set of 
equations employs a dummy variable for each month instead of the time trend, 
respectively, without and with inclusion of dependent variables from the other equations.  
The equations are estimated using ordinary least squares. 
                                                 




Estimation results for the first set of panel equations are presented in Table 4, and 
those for the last set are presented in Table 5.  For the sake of brevity, we report only 
these results; consistency of the other two specifications with these is discussed below.  
The first three columns in each table provide panel model estimation results for three 
credit quality measures: county average FICO score, average ratio of consumer debt 
payments to income (backend ratio), and combined loan-to-value ratio, respectively.  The 
next two columns provide the estimation results for two pricing terms: margin and credit 
limit, respectively.  The last column presents the results for the panel model for the rate 
of origination of new accounts, defined as number of accounts originated in the month 
and county per number of owner-occupied units in the county based on the 2000 U.S. 
census.  
Because the county-level regressions reflect the aggregate net effect of credit 
supply and demand over the time period examined, the results suggest a mix of credit 
cycle effects with precautionary borrowing and adverse selection effects.  On the one 
hand, credit cycle effects tend to dominate along the dimension of house price 
appreciation, with the regression results indicating increased credit risk during periods 
characterized by rapidly appreciating home values.  On the other hand, some results for 
credit quality in relation to consumer confidence and/or forward unemployment rate are 
consistent with precautionary borrowing motives or adverse selection.  In the next section 
of this paper, additional information regarding the payment performance of HELOC 
loans over time will be utilized to test for adverse selection effects on the part of HELOC 
borrowers during economic downturns. 
  Credit quality indicators.  We begin with the effects of consumer confidence and 
forward unemployment rate change on county average FICO score as of the origination 
date of newly originated HELOCs.  The FICO score is an observable measure of the 
credit quality of the pool of accepted HELOC borrowers.  Precautionary borrowing and 
adverse selection (deterioration in quality of the borrower pool) should be associated with 
low consumer confidence and a rising 12-month forward unemployment rate.  Thus, a 
positive coefficient on the consumer confidence index and a negative coefficient on the 
forward unemployment rate change would be consistent with the precautionary 
borrowing hypothesis.   15 
 
As seen in Tables 4 and 5, both estimated coefficients consistently support this 
hypothesis across each of the model specifications.  Moreover, both relationships are 
statistically and quantitatively significant in each of the model specifications.
16 
  It is also noteworthy that an increase in the house price index reduces the FICO 
score at origination, so that rising home values lower the observable quality of borrowers.  
This is most likely due to lenders being more willing to lend to risky borrowers when 
collateral is rising in value. 
  Next, we consider the back-end ratio, a measure of observable borrower quality as 
well as an indicator of willingness to incur debt.  An increase in the back-end ratio 
implies a more difficult debt burden for the borrower and thus a greater chance the 
borrower will default, but it may also signal a borrower’s confidence with respect to 
income prospects.  Consistent with the latter hypothesis, as seen in Tables 4 and 5, the 
average back-end ratio is positively related to consumer confidence, consistently across 
each of the model specifications.   
The forward change in the unemployment rate is not statistically significant in 
relation to the back-end ratio in the specification shown in Table 4.  In the specifications 
that employ time dummy variables, however, as in Table 5, the forward unemployment 
rate change exhibits a positive and statistically significant relationship to the average 
back-end ratio, consistent with precautionary borrowing and adverse selection. 
  An increase in the 12-month house price appreciation rate also raises the back-end 
ratio.  This can be interpreted as a combined demand and supply effect—rising house 
prices force households to stretch their borrowing and encourage lenders to ease credit 
conditions. 
The combined loan-to-value ratio (combined LTV) at the time of origination of 
the HELOC, like the back-end ratio, also measures credit quality as well as the 
borrower’s willingness to incur debt and the lender’s willingness to extend credit.  It is 
defined as the combined (summed) HELOC credit limit and (where the HELOC is not the 
first lien) first mortgage balance, as a ratio to the value of the home, at the time of 
                                                 
16 County-level mean FICO scores, measured at origination, have a mean within-county standard deviation 
of 9.8.  The mean within-county standard deviation of the regional consumer confidence index is 18.4, 
implying (with the estimated coefficient of .07) an impact of 1.3, or about 13 percent of the FICO within-
county standard deviation.  One standard deviation in the forward unemployment rate change is somewhat 
less important, with an impact of 0.4, or about 4 percent of the FICO standard deviation.  These are 
conservative assessments, because the indirect effect via the lagged dependent variable and any cross-
county effect are not considered. 16 
 
origination of the HELOC.  The higher the combined LTV, the smaller the homeowner’s 
equity stake in the home and, in general, the greater the credit risk to the lender.  The 
consumer confidence index generally (with the sole exception of the expanded 
specification in Table 5) does not exhibit a statistically significant relationship to 
combined LTV.  In the specifications that employ time dummy variables, including that 
shown in Table 5, the forward unemployment rate change exhibits a negative and 
statistically significant relationship to the average back-end ratio, consistent with reduced 
borrower willingness to incur debt and lender willingness to extend credit.  Credit cycle 
effects associated with the housing market cycle also are apparent—a recent rise in the 
house price index (12-month change) lowers the combined loan-to-value ratio.   
  Pricing variables.  The lender’s perception of the credit risk associated with a 
HELOC is reflected in the margin and credit limit.  A lender generally will price higher 
perceived credit risk through a larger margin or lower credit limit or a combination of the 
two.  As previously noted, the margin has a tiered structure, such that it depends on the 
amount drawn—as the balance increases above a specified threshold, the margin 
declines.  A caveat for the following discussion is that we cannot isolate the potential 
impacts of tiered pricing on changing margins.  Moreover, as with any market price, the 
margin (likewise, the credit limit) reflects general supply and demand conditions.  Also, 
note that the credit limit reflects not only the perceived credit risk but also the amount of 
equity the borrower has in the home prior to obtaining the HELOC. 
 The margin exhibits a statistically significant, inverse relationship to consumer 
confidence, while the credit limit exhibits a statistically significant, positive relationship 
to consumer confidence in the Table 4 specification and in its counterpart with monthly 
dummy variables.  As we have seen, the observable credit quality of borrowers (as 
measured by FICO score and back-end ratio) is positively related to the consumer 
confidence index, so it would be surprising if the margin and credit limit did not reflect 
the greater observable riskiness of these loans.  As seen in Table 5, the credit limit 
relationship to consumer confidence is robust to inclusion of the additional loan and 
borrower characteristics, but the margin relationship switches sign.  The latter result 
suggests that after controlling for these other observables, the credit cycle effect 
dominates, with stronger demand for HELOC borrowing during periods of elevated 
consumer confidence placing upward pressure on margins.    17 
 
In contrast, consistent with precautionary borrowing rather than a credit cycle 
effect, both margin and credit limit generally exhibit positive and statistically significant 
relationships to the forward change in unemployment rate.
17  The margin exhibits an 
inverse relationship to home values, whereas, not surprisingly, credit limits increase with 
home prices. 
  New accounts.  The pace of origination of new accounts is higher when the 
forward unemployment rate is rising, consistent with a precautionary motive for 
obtaining a HELOC, and consistent with the pricing relationships observed above.  This 
relationship is statistically significant across all model specifications.  
Mixed results are obtained for the pace of origination of new accounts in relation 
to the CCI. Arguably, the specifications that incorporate month dummies are more 
reliable because they address the seasonality in origination activity (apparent in Figure 1).  
The specification with month dummies indicates a positive and statistically significant 
relationship of origination activity to the CCI when the (endogenous) account and 
borrower characteristics are omitted.  In this case, the relationship is consistent with a 
credit cycle effect.  Again not surprisingly, an increase in the house price index has a 
positive impact on the pace of originations, while an increase in the prime rate has a 
negative impact. 
 
5. Competing Risk Hazard Analysis 
    We next estimate a hazard model of delinquency that analyzes HELOC payment 
performance in relation to the macroeconomic context as of the date the borrowing 
occurred.  The hazard that is modeled is 60-day delinquency.
18  The model controls for 
observable credit characteristics of the borrower and for economic conditions arising ex-
post.  Specifically, we test whether HELOC borrowers who draw on their credit lines in 
anticipation of reduced earnings or liquidity—when consumer confidence is low or 
unemployment elevated—are more likely to become seriously delinquent compared to 
those drawing on their credit lines under more favorable circumstances, holding 
observable characteristics constant.  Such a relationship would indicate that borrower 
                                                 
17 The sole exception is lack of statistical significance of the forward change in the unemployment rate in 
relation to the margin in the specification with time dummy variables without inclusion of the other 
borrower and account characteristics. 
18 A very small number of accounts (211) that reach charge-off at an earlier stage of delinquency are also 
treated as terminated. 18 
 
credit quality declines along unobservable dimensions as the state of the economy 
worsens, consistent with adverse selection effects tied to preemptive borrowing.    
    A complicating factor for the empirical analysis is the competing-risk effect of 
prepayment.  Prepayment causes censoring of observations because once a borrower 
prepays we cannot observe whether a default would have occurred later on.  In addition, 
an increase in the prepayment rate may reduce the credit quality of the remaining pool.
19  
The reason is straightforward—borrowers not responding to a drop in interest rates or 
other motivation to refinance a loan may be those whose credit condition has 
deteriorated, reducing their access to low-cost credit.   
    We equate prepayment of HELOC borrowers with termination of the account 
relationship, rather than simply paying down a balance to zero, because the latter often 
occurs without the account being closed and, hence, is less often associated with 
refinancing.  The competing risk hazard analysis treats prepayment as censoring.  In 
addition, we control for the potential selection effect of prepayment in a direct and 
somewhat novel way by including a lagged cumulative prepayment rate (calculated 
regionally within the HELOC sample, from the date of origination of the account) as an 
explanatory variable in the delinquency hazard model.   Moreover, we estimate a separate 
prepayment hazard model that, alongside the delinquency model, provides a 
comprehensive view of HELOC payment performance. 
    The unit of observation for the hazard model estimation is account and month.  
Each account’s payment status is tracked each month, until termination due to 60-day 
delinquency, prepayment, or end of the sample period.  We exclude from the estimation 
sample all HELOCs originated after May 2007, in order to ensure at least 3 months of 
observation of payment performance.  We again exclude borrowers located in Louisiana 
or Mississippi.  We include all accounts that reach 60-day delinquency and a 5 percent 
random sample of all other accounts. 
  The delinquency and prepayment hazard equations take the “proportional hazard” 
form: 
 (|X) = () exp(β1X1 + ∙ ∙ ∙ + βpXn) 
                                                 
19 This effect, often referred to as “burnout,” is also a relevant factor in prepayment modeling.  Borrowers 
who have not responded to prior refinance opportunities are likely to maintain a relatively low likelihood of 
prepayment.  For example, Calhoun and Deng (2002) find a statistically significant burnout effect for both 
prepayment and default of fixed-rate mortgages. 19 
 
The hazard rate h(t|x) in (1) is the rate of termination (60-day delinquency or 
prepayment) at time t conditional on an account surviving until t and conditional on a 
vector of covariates X; its relation to the cumulative survival probability S(t|X) is:  
 (|X) = ‐dlogS(t|X)/dt 
Under the proportional hazard assumption (1), the hazard rate consists of a baseline 
hazard rate h(t) that depends only on the survival time and a multiplier that is a function 
of the covariates.  The advantage of this approach is that it does not impose any 
restrictions on baseline hazard rates.  Moreover, estimates of the coefficients β1 through βp 
can be obtained by maximizing the partial likelihood function without any need to 
estimate the baseline hazard rates.
20  This is the approach we take, since we are 
concerned with testing relationships between the hazard rate and economic covariates, 
and not with the baseline hazard.  
    As noted in section 2, there are considerable differences in the risk profiles and 
payment performance of borrowers based on origination channel.  Therefore, we estimate 
the delinquency and prepayment hazard models separately for each of three origination 
channel categories: retail, broker, and wholesale.  To facilitate the estimation process, we 
reduce the sample size by selecting all accounts that terminate in 60-day delinquency and 
from the remaining accounts randomly select one out of every twenty.  We apply weights 
to adjust for the oversampling of delinquent accounts when estimating the hazard model. 
  Initial borrower and loan characteristics.  In testing for adverse selection effects 
associated with macroeconomic conditions at the time of borrowing, it is necessary to 
control for the borrower’s observable credit risk characteristics.  Three key credit risk 
measures provided in the data and used as explanatory variables for the delinquency 
model are the combined loan-to-value ratio; the borrower’s ratio of (total mortgage and 
consumer) debt payment to income; and the borrower’s credit (FICO) score, each 
measured as of the date of origination of the HELOC.  Reduced borrower equity in the 
home, as measured by a higher combined loan-to-value ratio; a higher debt payment 
ratio; and a lower FICO score are widely associated with increased credit risk, both in the 
academic literature on mortgage default and in mortgage underwriting practice.   
                                                 
20 See Allison (1995). 20 
 
    Credit line utilization is another factor typically predictive of payment 
performance.
21  We include a set of indicator variables distinguishing four ranges of 
credit line utilization as of the date of origination: less than 50 percent; greater than or 
equal to 50 and less than 75 percent; greater than or equal to 75 and less than 90 percent; 
and greater than 90 percent.   
  Figures 6 and 7 illustrate these risk relationships by means of survival curves derived 
from our HELOC sample.  Figure 6 shows survival curves for four FICO and utilization 
rate groupings (FICO above or below 680 and utilization above or below 90 percent), and 
Figure 7 shows survival curves for four combined LTV and back-end ratio groupings 
(LTV above or below 90 percent and back-end ratio above or below 45 percent).  For 
instance, borrowers with an original FICO below 680 and a utilization rate above 90 
percent are about 10 times as likely to reach 60 days delinquent within two years 
following origination as those with FICO scores above 680 and utilization rates below 90 
percent.   Borrowers with a combined LTV less than or equal to 90 percent and a back-
end ratio below 45 percent are about three times as likely to reach 60 days delinquent 
within two years following origination as those with a combined LTV above 90 percent 
and backend ratio above 45 percent. 
    Default risk may also vary by property type.  The only identified property type 
other than a single-family residence that is associated with a substantial number of 
accounts in the sample is a condo or co-op.  We include a dummy variable identifying 
condo or co-op. 
    Two additional variables are included as proxies for other observable borrower 
risk characteristics: the margin (over the index rate) determining the (variable) interest 
rate, and the log of the original credit limit.  In general, lower risk borrowers would 
receive more favorable credit terms, including a lower interest rate and higher credit 
limit.  However, these variables are also influenced by other factors.  For example, the 
margin can be affected by points and fees paid at origination (not reported in the data), 
and by the borrower’s financial savvy and wherewithal to negotiate a lower rate. 
  Initial economic conditions.  The economic variables of interest are those that 
proxy for borrower expectations about earnings or liquidity at the time the account is 
opened (and initially utilized).   Two such variables are included in the model: the 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2007) 21 
 
regional consumer confidence index, and the local area unemployment rate as of the 
origination date.   We also estimate a specification that additionally includes the 12-
month forward (from date of origination) change in the unemployment rate as a proxy for 
expected change in employment conditions.  (Alternatively, the 12-month forward 
change may be considered a control for ex-post economic conditions.)  In the presence of 
adverse selection effects tied to preemptive borrowing, HELOC borrowers who draw on 
their credit lines when consumer confidence is low or unemployment elevated or rising 
would exhibit higher ex-post delinquency rates. 
  Time-varying economic factors.  The model incorporates three time-varying 
indicators of ex-post economic conditions: local area house price appreciation, change in 
the prime rate, and the yield curve measure.  The first two are measured as change over 
the previous 12 months, or for accounts aged less than 12 months, since the date of 
origination.
22  We focus on the 12-month change (as opposed to the longer-term 
cumulative change since origination) because, over the longer term, HELOC borrowers 
might adapt to changing house values or interest rates through adjustments in account 
utilization, mitigating the impact on credit risk.
23  House price appreciation is measured 
as the change in the log of the local price index, while the prime rate change is the simple 
difference. 
    It is well known from the literature on mortgage default and delinquency that 
default rates are inversely related to local area house price appreciation.  The rate of 
change in house prices is a key factor that determines the change in the borrower’s equity 
in the home, affecting the borrower’s incentive to default, and more generally is a proxy 
for local housing market and economic conditions affecting mortgage credit risk.   
    A rise in the prime rate increases the borrower’s monthly payments and therefore 
may increase the likelihood of delinquency.  The yield curve reflects expectations of 
changing interest rates, which might affect the incentive to default.  For instance, a 
borrower experiencing financial difficulties may make less effort to keep current on the 
HELOC payment if interest rates are expected to rise, thus exacerbating the borrower’s 
financial situation.  Alternatively, the yield curve may proxy for general economic 
conditions. 
                                                 
22 As discussed below, results are robust to replacing the 12-month change with change since the date of 
origination.   
23 For example, borrowers might adapt to longer-term house price declines by reducing their account 
utilization.     22 
 
    As noted, the competing risk effect of prepayments is addressed by including a 
lagged cumulative prepayment rate (calculated at the census division level), as an 
explanatory variable in the model.  Specifically (for a given census division), let Nτ 
denote the number of open accounts in the sample as of month τ and let Cτ,τ+n denote the 
number that close (exit from the sample) between month τ and month τ+n (that is, they 
are in the sample in month τ but no longer present in τ+n).  To an account originated in 
month τ  and surviving into month τ+n, we assign the lagged cumulative prepayment rate:  
  (3)    PPRτ,τ+n = 1 – (Cτ,τ+n)/ Nτ 
  Prepayment  equation.  While the focus of this study is delinquency, it is 
important to understand prepayment behavior as well, since the two are interrelated in 
several ways.  First, as already noted, higher prepayment speeds typically are associated 
with declining credit quality of borrowers remaining in the pool.  Second, faster 
prepayment in effect reduces the average maturity of a pool, which implies lower 
cumulative default rates (although conditional default rates of borrowers remaining in the 
pool are higher).  Third, many of the same borrower characteristics and economic factors 
that are directly related to delinquency may also affect the propensity to prepay.  
Therefore, alongside the delinquency model we estimate a prepayment hazard model. 
    Studies of default and prepayment of first mortgages find that both exhibit 
relationships to some of the same variables.  In general, higher–credit-risk prime 
borrowers tend to have slower prepayment speeds, reflecting such factors as reduced 
mobility, or vulnerability to income, credit, liquidity, or employment setbacks that might 
impede the ability to refinance at favorable credit terms.
24  Studies also find that house 
price appreciation, while reducing the risk of default, tends to increase the likelihood of 
prepayment, which may reflect borrowers cashing out equity or shopping around for 
better credit terms based on their improved equity position.   Thus, the prepayment model 
includes as explanatory variables each of the initial borrower and loan characteristics and 
the time-varying measure of local area house price appreciation described above. 
                                                 
24 For example, Calhoun and Deng (2002) find that borrowers with higher original LTV or smaller original 
loan amounts, which are viewed as proxies for net worth and income, have lower prepayment speeds, 
controlling for the borrower’s current equity position and the value of the prepayment option.  Comparative 
behavior of prime and subprime borrowers is not so readily characterized in relation to credit risk, because 
of important differences with respect to a number of factors.  These include prevalence in the subprime 
market of prepayment penalties and of hybrid ARM loans with interest rate resets; ability of many 
subprime borrowers to qualify for a lower interest rate as their credit standing improves; and comparative 
propensities to refinance to cash out equity as home values appreciate.   23 
 
    Three additional time-varying factors are included in the prepayment model—the 
change in the prime rate, the yield curve measure and the monthly national refinance 
share of first-lien, prime, conventional conforming home mortgage applications.  An 
increase in the prime rate could make HELOC borrowing less attractive compared to the 
alternatives and motivate prepayment.  The yield curve may capture the incentive to 
refinance the variable rate HELOC into a fixed rate home equity loan (or consolidate the 
HELOC into a fixed rate first mortgage) as determined by the spread between long- and 
short-term interest rates.  Refinancing of first-lien mortgages may influence HELOC 
prepayment because borrowers may choose to consolidate their mortgage debt when 
refinancing their first mortgages. 
  Hazard  equation  estimates.  Results from estimation of the delinquency hazard 
equations are provided in Table 7, in separate columns by origination channel.  For the 
sake of brevity, we show results only for the two larger channels: retail and 
wholesale/other.
25  Qualitatively the same results are obtained for the broker channel. 
Looking first at the consumer confidence index and local unemployment rate, we find 
that households drawing on new credit lines when unemployment is elevated or 
confidence is low are more likely to fall behind in their payments.  In addition, likelihood 
of delinquency is positively related to the 12-month forward change in unemployment.  
These relationships are observed consistently across origination channels and are 
statistically significant.  Overall, the results are consistent with adverse selection 
associated with preemptive borrowing when household confidence in the economy has 
declined. 
    Other estimated coefficients of the delinquency hazard equations are generally as 
expected.  Likelihood of delinquency is strongly related to the house price and interest 
rate environment; slower house price growth, an increase in the prime rate, or 
expectations or rising interest rates (a steeper yield curve) are associated with increased 
delinquency on HELOC borrowing.   The likelihood of delinquency increases with the 
payment-to-income and combined loan-to-value ratios and is inversely related to FICO 
score.  Higher priced credit (a larger margin) and higher utilization rates are associated 
with an increased likelihood of delinquency.  We also observe evidence of selection 
effects associated with prepayment—likelihood of delinquency increases with cumulative 
                                                 
25 Results for the broker channel are available from the authors upon request. 24 
 
prepayments of a cohort of borrowers as defined by origination date and geographic 
region.  This effect is stronger for the retail channel than for wholesale (and broker), 
possibly because non-retail channels are subject to additional selection effects tied to the 
actions of the loan originator (the broker or correspondent institution) that might make 
the prepayment effect less pronounced. 
  Results from estimation of the prepayment hazard equations are provided in Table 
8, again only for the two larger channels. (Again, results are qualitatively the same for the 
broker channel.)  Prepayment of HELOC balances is very closely tied to market interest 
rate conditions as measured by the yield curve and changes in the prime rate.  Since 
HELOC payments are tied to the prime rate, an increase in the prime rate over the past 12 
months and expectations of further increases as represented by a steeper yield curve are 
associated with higher prepayment frequencies.  Also not surprisingly, prepayment of 
HELOC balances is very closely tied to refinancing of first-lien mortgages.  We also 
observe that higher credit risk HELOC borrowers, as indicated by a lower FICO score, 
higher combined loan-to-value ratio, and higher payment-to-income ratio, tend to have 
slower prepayment rates.  Interestingly, consistent with precautionary motives, an 
increase in the local unemployment rate subsequent to the account origination date is 
associated with slower prepayment. 
  Model  robustness.  We explored various alternative specifications and observed 
no substantial impact on the estimation results.   First, we dropped the yield curve 
measure, to address a potential concern about overfitting.  None of the other estimated 
coefficients were substantially changed.  Second, we substituted change since date of 
origination for the 12-month change in the prime rate and for measuring house price 
appreciation.  Again, the estimates were robust.  Third, we substituted a set of indicator 
variables for ranges of combined loan-to-value in place of the continuous measure; 
results were essentially unchanged.  Finally, we replaced the unemployment rate as of the 
date of origination with the change in the unemployment rate over the 12 months prior to 
origination as our proxy for borrower expectations about earnings or liquidity.   As with 
the level of unemployment, a rise in the unemployment rate prior to the date of 
origination is associated with an elevated risk of delinquency on the account; other 
estimated coefficients were not substantially affected by this substitution.     
   25 
 
 6. Conclusions  
    When the expected unemployment risk of households increases, we have shown 
that riskier households tend to borrow relatively more.  As a consequence, the pool of 
households that borrow on home equity lines of credit worsens along both observable and 
unobservable dimensions.  This is an interesting example of a type of dynamic adverse 
selection that can worsen the risk characteristics of new lending and suggests another 
avenue by which the precautionary demand for liquidity may affect borrowing.   
    One potential consequence of this occurrence is that lenders have to tighten credit 
standards not only because the risk appetite of the lenders has fallen either due to reduced 
capital or increased regulatory oversight, but because the inherent risk underlying 
observable characteristics is greater.  That is, lenders may engage in observably 
procyclical behavior in response to expected unobservable changes in the borrowing 
pool.   
    It has long been recognized that procyclical behavior of this type can exacerbate 
the cyclicality of credit markets and weaken the mechanisms that stabilize asset markets.  
To the extent that these procyclical behaviors exist in the interaction between borrowers 
and lenders, regulators may wish to seek countercyclical channels to strengthen the 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Categorical Variables 
 
 Retail  Broker  Wholesale 
Total count  99,163 11,419  119,583 
Lien  Status     
  % junior lien  98.2 99.3 99.8 
  % first lien   1.8 0.7 0.2 
Property  Type     
  % unknown  0.01  0.7  5.5 
  % condo or co-op  6.9  23.9  15.6 




Table 2: Summary Statistics for Continuous Variables 
 
 Number  of 
Accounts 
 






Retail  99,163     
  Credit Limit  99,163 $90,695 $60,000 $36,150  $106,000 
  Initial Utilization  99,163 68.25%  75% 42% 99% 
  Combined LTV   97,719 77.9% 80.0% 71.1% 90.0% 
  FICO at Origination  98,591 716.4  717 678 757 
  Payment-to-Income  98,233 35.1% 36.4% 26.3% 45.3% 
  Margin  98,978 0.81 0.35 0.00 1.49 
Broker  11,419     
  Credit Limit  11,419 $71,738 $53,600 $33,475 $85,250 
  Initial Utilization  11,419 93.4% 100% 100% 100% 
  Combined LTV   11,340 90.2% 90.0% 88.1%  99.75% 
  FICO at Origination  11,372 719.5  717 690 750 
  Payment-to-Income  11,282 37.6% 38.8% 32.0% 44.1% 
  Margin  11,254 1.63 1.63 0.88 2.25 
Wholesale/Other  119,583     
  Credit Limit  119,583 $79,423 $52,800 $30,420  $100,000 
  Initial Utilization  119,583 80.0 100% 61% 100% 
  Combined LTV   118,907 83.8% 89.1% 77.9% 95.0% 
  FICO at Origination  118,188 725.5  728 693 761 
  Payment-to-Income  108,632 36.25%  37.3% 29.9% 43.6% 




Table 3: Monthly Regional Consumer Confidence Index:  Jan 2002 – Aug 2007 
 
 Mean  Median  Min  Max 
Census Division      
East North Central  76.6  76.8  58.2  107.4 
West North Central  93.7  95.2  60.2  118.8 
Middle  Atlantic  80.7 82.9 54.7 99.1 
New England  86.9 87.7 56.8  111.4 
Mountain  112.8 115.8  59.9  144.3 
Pacific  101.2 103.3  63.0  128.4 
South Atlantic  110.0 112.2  70.8  132.7 
East South Central  95.7 99.3 59.7  122.5 
West South Central  110.5 111.2  62.3  132.9 
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Table 4.  Panel regressions with  county fixed effects 
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0.171 0.557  0.332  0.738 0.782 0.652 
T-statistics in parentheses.   
Significance: **1 % *5%  
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Table 5.  Panel regressions with county fixed effects and time dummies 
















































































































Within R-square  0.324  0.606  0.442  0.828  0.811  0.844 
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Table 6: Estimation Results for the Delinquency Hazard Model 
 
  Retail Wholesale 
Hazard Ratio / Chi-
square 
Hazard Ratio / Chi-
square 
Hazard Ratio / Chi-
square 
Hazard Ratio / Chi-
square 
Initial economic conditions           
CCI  0.807** 16.5 0.752** 28.7 0.849**  8.4  0.792**  16.9 
Unemployment    1.042**  64.4  1.057** 113.7 1.032**  38.1  1.050**  89.7 
Forward change in 
unemployment  
   5.222**  121.8     7.736**  191.0 
Time-varying factors           
House  price  change  0.507** 2292.8 0.534** 1871.0 0.570** 1605.5 0.602**  1257.3 
Yield  curve  1.244** 407.2 1.207** 298.2 1.269** 702.6 1.213**  429.2 
Prime  rate  change  1.843** 3199.4 1.804** 2905.1 1.636** 2208.3 1.608**  2014.8 
Prepay  percentage  11.14** 309.0 14.41** 369.2 2.124**  28.0  2.573**  43.1 
Utilization rate at origination           
 < 50%  0.462**  1299.0  0.466**  1273.1  0.531**  552.4  0.531**  554.4 
≥  50%  and  <  75%  0.578** 645.2 0.580** 637.3 0.650** 262.4 0.652**  258.8 
≥  75%  and  <  90%  0.678** 311.3 0.680** 305.2 0.714** 152.2 0.719**  146.6 
Other risk characteristics            
Payment-to-income  1.879** 111.9 1.884** 112.6 3.181** 179.4 3.160**  177.4 
Log  credit  limit  0.996 0.1 0.993 0.5  0.967**  8.5  0.970**  7.0 
FICO  0.881** 5647.2 0.880** 5698.1 0.884** 3635.1 0.884**  3263.1 
Combined  LTV  4.321** 594.4 4.385** 606.2 2.286** 144.8 2.319**  150.0 
Margin  1.224** 1161.0 1.221** 1135.4 1.309** 1087.8 1.315**  1116.4 
Condo-Co-op  1.232** 56.0 1.240** 58.9  0.990  0.2  1.002  0.0 
Estimation summary 
statistics 
      
No. of observations  92,269  89,953  102,050  99,824 
Event  count  18,372 18,332 17,520  17,485 
Likelihood  ratio  22466.8 22212.3 15718.7  15636.8 
Wald  chi-square  22731.9 22399.1 15878.3  15828.0 
 
Significance: **1 % *5%  
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Table 7: Estimation Results for the Prepayment Hazard Model 
 
  Retail Wholesale 
Hazard Ratio / Chi-
square 
Hazard Ratio / Chi-
square
Hazard Ratio / Chi-
square 
Hazard Ratio / Chi-
square
Initial economic conditions            
CCI  1.091** 118.3 1.053**  41.1  0.900** 234.5  0.908**  194.3 
Unemployment   1.002**  7.5  0.998  2.7  0.998**  9.6  0.996**  25.6 
Forward change in 
unemployment 
   0.723**  159.0     0.871**  43.5 
Time-varying factors            
House price change  0.997**  1.8  1.013**  29.7  1.021**  126.2  1.032**  278.4 
Yield curve  1.241**  13129.7  1.222**  10978.9  1.343**  49669.4  1.325**  43240.9 
Prime rate change  2.049**  162025.6  1.989** 140530.8 1.763** 148120.4 1.719** 128109.6 
PMMS refinance %  1.059**  81876.4  1.058** 76224.0 1.033** 64601.6 1.032** 58239.6 
Utilization rate at origination            
 < 50%  0.987**  18.3  0.992**  7.3  1.011**  15.3  1.013**  22.1 
≥ 50% and < 75%  0.994  3.1  0.998  0.2  0.997  1.3  1.001  0.2 
≥ 75% and < 90%  0.985**  15.7  0.991*  6.3  1.002  0.3  1.006  2.9 
Other risk characteristics             
Payment-to-income 0.957**  23.6  0.954**  27.0  0.958**  17.1  0.954**  20.7 
Log credit limit  1.015**  86.1  1.011**  49.7  1.002  2.8  1.000  0.0 
Log FICO  1.002**  68.0  1.002**  68.9  1.002**  46.6  1.001**  29.2 
Combined  LTV  0.909** 177.0 0.906** 190.1 0.951**  50.7  0.959**  36.0 
Margin 0.995**  21.3  0.999  0.3  0.998  3.5  0.998  1.8 
Condo-Coop 1.010*  4.0  1.003  0.3  0.983**  38.7  0.981**  44.1 
Estimation summary 
statistics 
     
No. of observations  92,269  89,953  102,050  99,824 
Event count  35,696  35,603  52,411  52,253 
Likelihood ratio  465851.4  416492.9  384829.7  337606.9 
Wald chi-square  373295.0  340229.9  299900.9  268177.2 
Bold type indicates statistical significance at the 5% level or greater. 